 Vertikal verbundene Märkte im Raum / Vertical Integration in Spatial MarketsJournal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), 2001, vol. 221, issue 4, 394-403 Abstract: Are there individual and/or overall economic incentives for vertical integration in a two-stage spatial Market? In order to give an answer to this question, we present a model with retail locations arranged at similar distances along a circular line and a monopolistic supplier in the center of the circle. Two cases are discussed in this paper: In the first case, the retailers and the producer are legally and organizationally independent enterprises with isolated individual profit maximization. In the second case, the markets are vertically integrated. It can be shown that in all markets the profits are higher in the second case. Furthermore, in the first case, the higher retail price leads to a lower consumers' surplus and, therefore, to smaller welfare effects than in the second case. In the presented model, there are strong incentives for vertical integration of the firms. Keywords: Vertical integration; downstream competition; upstream monopoly; Vertikal verbundene Märkte; vertikale Integration; zweistufige Märkte; Vertical integration; downstream competition; upstream monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:221:y:2001:i:4:p:394-403 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik) is currently edited by Peter Winker More articles in Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik) from De Gruyter |
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