Steuerreform und Unternehmensfinanzierung / Tax Reform and Corporate Finance
Wolfgang Eggert and
Alfons Weichenrieder
Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), 2002, vol. 222, issue 5, 531-555
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the change in tax preferences induced by the recent German corporate tax reform. The reform eliminates the imputation system and shifts the system towards a classical corporate tax system. However, financial preferences of corporations are largely unaffected if evaluated from the perspective of shareholders subject to the top marginal tax rate. A similar statement holds for the incentives to carry out share repurchases that in Germany have been allowed only recently. This paper argues that the much-discussed elimination of capital gains taxation for corporations abolishes a tax preference for new equity finance of affiliated corporations.
Keywords: Tax reform; corporate financial policy; capital gains tax; share repurchases; Steuerreform; Finanzierungspräferenzen; steuerliche Veräußerungsgewinne; Aktienrückkauf; Tax reform; corporate financial policy; capital gains tax; share repurchases (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:222:y:2002:i:5:p:531-555
DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2002-0503
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