Ökonometrische Analyse der Entscheidungspraxis des Bundeskartellamtes / Econometric Analysis of the Decisions of the German Federal Cartel Office

Lauk Martina ()
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Lauk Martina: Technische Universität Darmstadt, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, FG Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung und MikroÖkonometrie, Residenzschloss, Marktplatz 15, D-64283 Darmstadt

Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), 2003, vol. 223, issue 6, 680-711

Abstract: In economic theory there is invariably a credible defence for all corporate competition practices. For the most part, the effects on static and dynamic competition functions cannot be uniquely identified. This gives economic policymakers a certain scope of discretion, and responsible decision makers have to weigh the possible positive and negative consequences of horizontal and vertical strategies. It also raises the question of the extent to which economic theory influences the decisions of cartel authorities. This paper will survey the decisions of the German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt or BKartA) on abusive practices and cartels. It will focus mainly on to what extent the decisions of the Bundeskartellamt can be "explained" through knowledge of the criticised "anti-competitive" practice and observable market structure features. The intention is to draw conclusions about the competition model used as a policy guideline in German Competition Law. The data presented was collected within an protracted and costly case analysis at the German Cartel Office in Bonn. The discrete-choice analysis includes 196 cases and appendant decisions in the field of abusive practices and cartels between 1985-2000. An important finding of the paper is that, besides type of anticompetitive conduct, concentrations measures and an involvement of the market leader have a significant and robust effect on the decisions of the Cartel Office. The "mechanistic" method of explanation shows a reasonably high success rate of 75,69 %.

Keywords: German Federal Cartel Office; empirical industrial economics; competition policy; Bundeskartellamt; Wettbewerbspolitik; empirische Industrieökonomik; German Federal Cartel Office; empirical industrial economics; competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:223:y:2003:i:6:p:680-711

DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2003-0604

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