A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations

Hofmann Elisa (), Kyriacou Lucas () and Schmidt Klaus M. ()
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Hofmann Elisa: Department of Intercultural Studies and Business Communications, University of Jena, Ernst-Abbe-Platz 8, D-07743 Jena, Germany
Kyriacou Lucas: Department of Economics, University of Bern, Schanzeneckstraße 1, CH-3001 Bern, Switzerland
Schmidt Klaus M.: Department of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstraße 28, D-80539 Munich, Germany

Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), 2023, vol. 243, issue 5, 543-566

Abstract: Weitzman, M.L. (2014. Can negotiating a uniform carbon price help to internalize the global warming externality? J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1: 29–49) proposed that focusing international climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform carbon price) is more effective than negotiations on individual commitments (as in the Paris agreement) in achieving ambitious climate action. We put this hypothesis to an experimental test by simulating international negotiations on climate change in collaboration with Model United Nations associations. This novel experimental format combines some of the advantages of lab and field experiments. Our results offer support for Weitzman’s hypothesis and indicate that negotiating a common commitment on a uniform carbon price may yield higher emission reductions in the long run and more participation than individual commitments à la Paris.

Keywords: climate negotiations; negotiation design; model united nations; uniform carbon price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C81 C93 F51 H87 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:243:y:2023:i:5:p:543-566:n:6

DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2021-0054

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