Economic Freedom and Corruption: New Cross-Country Panel Data Evidence
Steven Yamarik () and
Chelsea Redmon
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Chelsea Redmon: California State University
The Journal of Private Enterprise, 2017, vol. 32, issue 2, 17-44
Abstract:
This paper examines the empirical relationship between economic freedom and corruption. We use a principal-agent-client model to identify the potential causal linkages between corruption and the components of economic freedom. We then estimate a two-equation system where freedom depends on corruption and vice versa. Using a series of panel GMM estimators, we find that corruption lowers economic freedom, but that freedom does not significantly impact corruption. The result that corruption lowers freedom supports the “grabbing hand†theory of corruption, where a nonbenevolent government creates inefficient regulation and barriers to entry to generate economic rents. ______________________________________________________
Keywords: economic freedom; corruption; panel data; GMM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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