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The Durability of Legislative Benefits and the Role of the Executive Branch’s Settlement Authority

Bryan P. Cutsinger
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Bryan P. Cutsinger: Angelo State University

The Journal of Private Enterprise, 2019, vol. 34, issue 1, 1-14

Abstract: Following the 2008 financial crisis, the US Department of Justice required several large financial institutions to pay large cash settlements for their role in the collapse of the residential mortgage-backed securities market. A fraction of these cash settlements was funneled to government-approved nonprofit beneficiaries, many of whom had seen their government grants reduced by Congress. I argue that this transfer is an insurance contract that the government uses to improve the durability of contracts between special interest groups and the legislature. ______________________________________________________

Keywords: separation of powers; contractual durability; rent extraction; administrative state; bank settlements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H27 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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