The Concentration of Power in a Single Hand: Administrative Centralization and State and Local Drug Enforcement Policy in the United States, 1995–2016
Thomas Savidge
Additional contact information
Thomas Savidge: George Mason University
The Journal of Private Enterprise, 2019, vol. 34, issue 2, 65-80
Abstract:
This paper explores the relationship between the federal prohibition of illicit substances in the United States, the growth of administrative centralization, and the effects of this governing structure on drug prohibition’s success. Within a framework of Tocqueville’s conception of administrative centralization, it examines US drug enforcement policy from 1995 to the present and the results of drug prohibition on increased arrests and illicit drug use. It also examines trends of social trust and discusses the crowding-out effect, police centralization, and the relationship of both to democratic despotism. ______________________________________________________
Keywords: drug prohibition; Tocqueville; administrative centralization; police centralization; social trust; democratic despotism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P37 P48 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://journal.apee.org/wp-content/uploads/journal/23954.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jpe:journl:1579
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://journal.apee ... _no_2_summer_parte4/
Access Statistics for this article
The Journal of Private Enterprise is currently edited by Edward Peter Stringham
More articles in The Journal of Private Enterprise from The Association of Private Enterprise Education Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().