Rethinking Regulatory Capture
Randall Holcombe
The Journal of Private Enterprise, 2022, vol. 37, issue 1, 33-45
Abstract:
The capture theory of regulation concludes that regulatory agencies act in the interests of regulated firms rather than in the general public interest. Those benefits to regulated firms are transitory. In the long run, regulatory protections benefit legislators and regulators by making those who are regulated dependent on those who have the power to extend or terminate those regulatory protections. Regulated firms must continue to support the interests of the politicians on whose decisions their profitability depends. Ultimately, firms are captured by those who regulate them, rather than the other way around.
Keywords: regulation; rent seeking; transitional gains; capture theory; legislative processes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 L51 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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