The Taming of the Condottieri
Gor Mkrtchian
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Gor Mkrtchian: Free Market Institute at Texas Tech University
The Journal of Private Enterprise, 2022, vol. 37, issue 2, 39-46
Abstract:
Mercenaries were hired by the Italian city-states in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. They could, and at times did, betray their employers. Why did the city-states hire them despite the potential for treachery, and how did the city- states endeavor to minimize this principal-agent problem? In this article, I qualitatively analyze why Italian city-states chose to employ the mercenaries and what tools the city-states used to attempt to solve the problem. In doing so, I draw and expand upon Austrian contributions to political- entrepreneurship and institutional analysis.
Keywords: economic history; political economy; mercenaries; Italy; political entrepreneurship; condottieri (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H56 J41 N43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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