U.S. Airline Antitrust Policy and Empty Core Disequilibrium
Thomas Tacker
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Thomas Tacker: Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
The Journal of Private Enterprise, 2009, vol. 25, issue 1, 69-79
Abstract:
The concept of an “empty core†is applied to better understand the US airline industry and how anti-trust policy might best be altered to help the industry perform better for both consumers and investors. Horrendous financial losses over the long term suggest an empty core and point to likely increases in future industry concentration. These and other related problems might be solved by allowing competing airlines to more freely form alliances. The industry’s history of incredibly intense competition suggests that any problematic tendency to turn efficient cooperation into inefficient collusion might well be prevented by natural rivalries.
Keywords: Competition; Antitrust Law; Empty core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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