Insider Trading: Is There an Economist in the Room?
Alexandre Padilla and
Brian Gardiner
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Brian Gardiner: The Metropolitan State College of Denver
The Journal of Private Enterprise, 2009, vol. 24, issue 2, 113-136
Abstract:
This paper examines economists' opinions on insider trading and their policy recommendations. We review the economic literature and survey 3,000 economists to ask them their thoughts on insider trading. We find that economists traditionally favor government regulation of insider trading. In addition, the results of our survey show that, when unfamiliar with insider trading, economists tend to rely on the more familiar model of the perfectly competitive market as a normative benchmark to assess the desirability of insider trading. As a result, these economists also tend to support government regulation of insider trading. Our analysis sheds a new light on the formation of economists' normative views. It also offers a possible explanation, complementing Public Choice models, for the origins and dynamics of the regulatory process.
Keywords: Law; Criminal Law; Stock Exchange; Government policy; Economists; Interventionism; Ethics; Public choice theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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