Rent-Seeking and Decline in the French Wine Industry
Nikolai G. Wenzel
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Nikolai G. Wenzel: Florida Gulf Coast University
The Journal of Private Enterprise, 2012, vol. 27, issue 2, 63-81
Abstract:
The judgment of Paris, in which California wines first surpassed the French in a blind tasting, shook the world in 1976. But it was not until 2003 that New World wines outpaced French exports. Demand-side factors affect French wine; however, the supply side is more intriguing. France's regulatory environment can be sustained only through monopolistic rent- seeking and taxpayer subsidies. In keeping with the transitional gains trap literature, rents appear to have been exhausted; while some segments of the French wine industry would benefit from the ability to innovate, much of the industry would likely collapse without the current framework.
Keywords: Innovation; Tradition; Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée; French wine; New world wine; Public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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