How Firms Can Build Trust When Products Have Hidden Characteristics
Craig J. Richardson
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Craig J. Richardson: Winston-Salem State University
The Journal of Private Enterprise, 2012, vol. 28, issue 1, 1-22
Abstract:
A potentially large problem in some markets is that low trust occurs between consumers and firms where product quality and the firm’s time frame are difficult to discern. The paper employs a simple heuristic model that seeks to explain under what circumstances firms will seek to build a reputation for honesty—or “cut and run†with short-run profits. The contributions here are two: First, to expand on the idea that firms can build a reputation by confessing a defect (or otherwise sacrificing short-term profits) and two, to emphasize how the time frame of the firm plays a critical role in whether or not it will be honest. The paper explains how trust in these markets can be improved as the time frame lengthens.
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Reputation; Regulation; Hidden; Trust; Firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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