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Contract Incentives and Effort

Peter Chinloy () and Daniel T. Winkler ()
Additional contact information
Peter Chinloy: American University
Daniel T. Winkler: University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Journal of Real Estate Research, 2010, vol. 32, issue 4, 397-412

Abstract: In a prevailing employment contract, the agent receives a proportional split of commissions. Alternatively, the agent receives a contract paying 100% of revenue above a fixed payment to the firm. In this contract the firm has a prior payment position, similar to a landlord or lender. The coexistence of these equity-only and debt-equity type contracts allows testing incentives for productivity and effort for U.S. real estate licensees. Hourly wages and productivity are increasing in the agent's split, up to and including 100%. Effort as measured by hours worked also positively affected by the split. The contract incentives motivate productivity and induce effort without requiring monitoring.

JEL-codes: L85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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