Do Team-Specific Revenues Matter in Baseball’s Arbitration System?

Phil Miller ()

International Journal of Sport Finance, 2006, vol. 1, issue 3, 162-173

Abstract: According to baseball’s collective bargaining agreement, arbitrators may not consider team finances when rendering a decision. The author develops two theories to examine the setting of final offers. In the first theory, final offers are simply functions of the arbitral criteria and are, therefore, not a function of the revenue-generating capability of the team. In the second theory, the author argues that teams may trade some talented and, thus, high-priced arbitrationeligible players, resulting in an implicit premium embedded in the final offers. The empirical analysis suggests that there are no such premiums embedded in the final offers.

Keywords: Arbitration; team finances; player salaries; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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International Journal of Sport Finance is currently edited by Arne Feddersen, Babatunde Buraimo, Joachim Prinz and Jane Ruseski

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