How does competition affect real earnings management to meet or beat targets? Evidence from import tariff reductions

Alex Young ()
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Alex Young: North Dakota State University

Annals of Finance, 2018, vol. 14, issue 3, No 2, 342 pages

Abstract: Abstract Targets provide incentives for earnings management, and a longstanding question is whether earnings management is undertaken opportunistically or to communicate private information about future firm value. To discriminate between these motivations, I follow analytical research showing that an increase in competition through a large decrease in tariffs disciplines managers and better aligns their interests with those of shareholders. Thus, if earnings management reflects managerial opportunism, then an increase in competition will decrease earnings management; and if it signals future performance expectations, then an increase in competition will increase earnings management. Consistent with earnings management indicating managerial opportunism, I show that an increase in competition decreases real earnings management to avoid reporting negative earnings or a negative change in earnings. In addition, by showing that the lessening of trade barriers through import tariff reductions reduces the use of real earnings management to meet or beat earnings targets, I provide evidence on the role of macroeconomic conditions as a determinant of earnings quality.

Keywords: Financial accounting; Earnings quality; Earnings targets; Managerial opportunism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s10436-017-0313-0

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