EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Internal financing, managerial compensation and multiple tasks

Sandro Brusco () and Fausto Panunzi ()
Additional contact information
Sandro Brusco: Stony Brook University
Fausto Panunzi: Università Bocconi

Annals of Finance, 2020, vol. 16, issue 4, No 2, 527 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study the optimal capital budgeting policy of a firm taking into account the choice between internal and external financing. The manager can dedicate effort either to increase short-term profitability, thus generating greater immediate cash-flow, or to improve long-term perspectives. When both types of effort are observable, low productivity firms end up using internal funds, while high productivity firms use external capital markets. When effort to boost short-term cash flow is observable, while effort to boost long-term profitability is not, non-monotonic policies may be optimal. In such cases financing switches back and forth between internal and external funds as the quality of the project increases.

Keywords: Capital budgeting; Multitask agent; Corporate finance; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 G31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10436-020-00375-z Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:annfin:v:16:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s10436-020-00375-z

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/finance/journal/10436/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10436-020-00375-z

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Finance is currently edited by Anne Villamil

More articles in Annals of Finance from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:kap:annfin:v:16:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s10436-020-00375-z