Switching to a poor business activity: optimal capital structure, agency costs and covenant rules

Jean-Paul Décamps and Bertrand Djembissi

Annals of Finance, 2007, vol. 3, issue 3, 389-409

Keywords: Capital structure; Stockholder–debtholder conflict; Covenant rules; G30; G32; G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: Switching to a Poor Business Activity: Optimal Capital Structure, Agency Costs and Convenant Rules (2005)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10436-006-0049-8

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