Why no cycles

Gordon Tullock

Atlantic Economic Journal, 2000, vol. 28, issue 1, 13 pages

Abstract: This article explains the absence of cycles in regular governmental voting procedures. Most acts of Congress and other legislative bodies are the result of the negotiation carried on in private. As a result of this negotiation, the bill would be impossible to beat by any ordinary alternative. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2000

Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF02300525 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:28:y:2000:i:1:p:1-13

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/11293/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/BF02300525

Access Statistics for this article

Atlantic Economic Journal is currently edited by Kathleen S. Virgo

More articles in Atlantic Economic Journal from Springer, International Atlantic Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().