Can the European Community Afford to Neglect the Need for More Accountable Safety-Net Management?

Edward Kane

Atlantic Economic Journal, 2006, vol. 34, issue 2, 127-144

Abstract: As financial institutions and markets transact more and more cross-border business, gaps and flaws in national safety nets become more consequential. Because citizens of host (home) countries may be made to pay for mistakes made in the home (host) country, Basel's lead-regulator paradigm violates the principle of democratic accountability. Because important differences exist in policymaking authority, instruments, and goals, banking supervisors need to improve their ability to monitor and mitigate the consequences of defects in one another's performance. A straightforward way to enhance both capacities would be to establish opportunities for public trading in debt obligations and reinsurance derivatives issued by country-level deposit-insurance entities. Copyright IAES 2006

Keywords: F36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11293-006-9000-7 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Can the European Community Afford to Neglect the Need for More Accountable Safety-Net Management? (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:34:y:2006:i:2:p:127-144

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/11293/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11293-006-9000-7

Access Statistics for this article

Atlantic Economic Journal is currently edited by Kathleen S. Virgo

More articles in Atlantic Economic Journal from Springer, International Atlantic Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().