Candidate Ambition and Advancement under Term Limits

Natalya Brown ()

Atlantic Economic Journal, 2014, vol. 42, issue 1, 53-64

Abstract: In this paper, I present a model of candidate entry into a two-tiered hierarchy of political positions with the objective of exploring the extent to which term limits at lower level political positions alter the average skill of office-seekers for higher level political positions. In addition, this paper analyzes whether the increase in political skill in upper level office holders comes at the expense of lower level political positions. The results suggest that under certain conditions term limits on lower level elected offices may reduce the expected political skill of officeholders at the lower level without guaranteeing an increase in skill at the upper level. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2014

Keywords: Politicians; Political ambition; Term limits; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s11293-013-9397-8

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