EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Regulating Cournot Oligopoly with Environmental Externalities

Shizuka Nishikawa ()

Atlantic Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 43, issue 4, 449-462

Abstract: We construct a model to analyze an oligopoly with two types of technology that produce an undifferentiated product: a cleaner but more expensive technology and a dirtier but less expensive technology. We construct a two-stage model in which firms choose their technology in the first stage and their profit maximizing quantities in the second stage. We then introduce stage zero, in which the government chooses its policy: a lump-sum fee, a specific tax, a subsidy, or a permit to label the product produced with the cleaner technology. We show that the government can achieve the highest social welfare with eco-labeling when most of the consumers are eco-conscious. Otherwise a subsidy or a tax achieves the highest social welfare depending on the degree of environmental damage. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2015

Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; Environmental externalities; Tax; Subsidy; Lump-sum fee; Eco-labeling; JEL; H23; L13; Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11293-015-9475-1 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:43:y:2015:i:4:p:449-462

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/11293/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Atlantic Economic Journal is currently edited by Kathleen S. Virgo

More articles in Atlantic Economic Journal from Springer, International Atlantic Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2019-05-15
Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:43:y:2015:i:4:p:449-462