Evolutionary Equilibria in Network Markets
Thomas J. Webster ()
Additional contact information
Thomas J. Webster: Pace University
Atlantic Economic Journal, 2016, vol. 44, issue 3, 325-334
Abstract Evolutionary game theory predicts that new survival strategies arise from random mutations. Over time, mutants genetically encoded with the superior survival strategy will have more offspring and nonmutants will be driven from the population. This paper argues that the introduction of a mutant technology with strong positive feedback and cascade effects into the market for a network good may result in something like an evolutionarily stable equilibrium that increases social welfare.
Keywords: Evolutionary equilibrium; Game theory; Herding; Network goods; Positive feedback effects; C73; D49; L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11293-016-9503-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:44:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s11293-016-9503-9
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/11293/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Atlantic Economic Journal is currently edited by Kathleen S. Virgo
More articles in Atlantic Economic Journal from Springer, International Atlantic Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Sonal Shukla ().