Economic Institutions and the Durability of Democracy
Christopher J. Boudreaux and
Randall G. Holcombe ()
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Christopher J. Boudreaux: Texas A&M International University
Randall G. Holcombe: Florida State University
Atlantic Economic Journal, 2017, vol. 45, issue 1, 17-28
Abstract Why do some democracies persist while others break down? Some studies have suggested that economic development decreases the likelihood of authoritarian reversal, which is consistent with Milton Friedman’s argument that economic freedom is necessary for political freedom. An empirical investigation of countries that have transitioned to democratic governments since World War II shows that higher quality economic institutions increase the durability of those democratic governments. This supports Friedman’s observation about the relationship between economic and political institutions.
Keywords: Institutions; Democracy; Durability; Economic freedom; P12; P16; P51; O57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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