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How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes

Archontis L. Pantsios () and Solomon Polachek
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Archontis L. Pantsios: Liverpool Hope University

Atlantic Economic Journal, 2017, vol. 45, issue 2, 149-161

Abstract: Abstract The joint costs model states that increasing union and firm strike costs lead to fewer strikes. This paper shows that strike incidence need not decrease when joint strike costs increase. The innovation is to raise union and firm joint strike costs in an asymmetric way. The results indicate that increasing either party’s strike costs can have ambiguous effects on strike incidence. This ambiguity explains why higher strike costs need not always lead to fewer strikes, and thus accounts for the mixed success observed in studies that empirically test the joint costs model with strike incidence data.

Keywords: Strike activity; Joint strike costs; Game of chicken; J51; J52; C72; C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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