Quality of Institutions and Violence Incidence: a Cross-Country Analysis
Edinaldo Tebaldi () and
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Erik Alda: American University
Atlantic Economic Journal, 2017, vol. 45, issue 3, 365-384
Abstract This paper utilizes two alternative econometric strategies to test the hypothesis that countries with poor institutional arrangements create an environment with increased impunity, thus providing incentives for potential law-breakers to engage in criminal activities that lead to rapid contagion of violence. Several measures of institutions including legal, political, market, government, and sociocultural institutions are considered in the paper. The empirical analysis provides evidence that the impact of institutional quality on violence is important regardless of income levels. This finding implies that differences in quality of institutions explain why countries with similar levels of income per capita may have different rates of violence and crime. In addition, the results show that quality of institutions matter for a successful long-term strategy to reduce violence.
Keywords: Violence; Institutions; Development; K00; O40; O50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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