A Possible Conflict between Economic Efficiency and Political Pressure

Phillip Simmons () and Oscar Cacho

Computational Economics, 2005, vol. 26, issue 2, 129-140

Abstract: A model of a production externality between two industries facing price uncertainty is specified and a Pigouvian tax introduced and solved using First-Order Conditions (FOC). This solution is then used as a baseline for comparison with results for the level of tax found using an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) where government, as the policy setter, is facing political pressure in the selective environment of the electorate. It is found in the EA solution that if a government faces political pressure in an uncertain economic environment then the settings for the tax may reflect political caution rather than community preferences. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: evolutionary algorithm; Pigouvian tax; political preferences; pollution tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10614-005-6869-1 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:compec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:129-140

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10614/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10614-005-6869-1

Access Statistics for this article

Computational Economics is currently edited by Hans Amman

More articles in Computational Economics from Springer, Society for Computational Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().