Controllability in Policy Games: Policy Neutrality and the Theory of Economic Policy Revisited
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and
Andrew Hughes Hallett ()
Computational Economics, 2006, vol. 28, issue 2, 91-112
Keywords: LQ-policy games; policy neutrality; policy effectiveness; controllability; Tinbergen system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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