Learning Agents in an Artificial Power Exchange: Tacit Collusion, Market Power and Efficiency of Two Double-auction Mechanisms
Eric Guerci (),
Stefano Ivaldi () and
Silvano Cincotti ()
Computational Economics, 2008, vol. 32, issue 1, 73-98
Keywords: Agent-based simulation; Power exchange; Market power; Reinforcement learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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