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Learning Agents in an Artificial Power Exchange: Tacit Collusion, Market Power and Efficiency of Two Double-auction Mechanisms

Eric Guerci (), Stefano Ivaldi () and Silvano Cincotti ()

Computational Economics, 2008, vol. 32, issue 1, 73-98

Keywords: Agent-based simulation; Power exchange; Market power; Reinforcement learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/s10614-008-9127-5

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