Numerical Solutions of Asymmetric, First-Price, Independent Private Values Auctions

Wayne-Roy Gayle () and Jean-Francois Richard

Computational Economics, 2008, vol. 32, issue 3, 245-278

Keywords: Auctions; Numerical solution; Asymmetric first price; Independent private values; Ex-ante heterogeneity; Expected revenues; Optimal reserve; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10614-008-9125-7

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