The Duo-Item Bisection Auction

Albin Erlanson ()

Computational Economics, 2014, vol. 43, issue 1, 15-31

Abstract: This paper proposes an iterative sealed-bid auction for selling multiple heterogeneous items to bidders interested in buying at most one item. It generalizes the single item bisection auction (Grigorieva et al. Econ Theory, 30:107–118, 2007 ) to the environment with multiple heterogeneous items. We focus on the case with two items for sale. We show that the auction elicits a minimal amount of information on preferences required to find the Vickrey–Clark–Groves outcome (Clarke, Public Choice, XI:17–33, 1971 ; Groves, Econometrica, 61:617–631, 1973 ; Vickrey, J Finance, 16:8–37, 1961 ), when there are two items for sale and an arbitrary number of bidders. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Bisection auction; Multi-item; Unit-demand; Sealed-bid; D44; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10614-013-9380-0

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