Partially and Wholly Overlapping Networks: The Evolutionary Dynamics of Social Dilemmas on Social Networks

Yanlong Zhang ()

Computational Economics, 2015, vol. 46, issue 1, 14 pages

Abstract: It has been widely accepted that the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas is likely to have simultaneous effects on different levels of networks—that is, overlapping networks. In this scenario, we apply the evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas (the Prisoner’s dilemma and the Stag Hunt) to two levels of networks, playing network interaction game (scale-free networks) and imitating the strategies of dynamic learning networks by concentrating on the levels of dynamically overlapping levels in both networks. It was found that the higher level of dynamically overlap can promote the emergence of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt. When networks overlap dynamically, it leads to cooperation in the Stag Hunt; when the networks do not overlap, cooperation will not occur in the Prisoner’s dilemma. Specifically, if two kinds of networks in the real world truly dynamically overlap at least partially, in some sense, the self-organizing phenomenon arising out of the overlapping effect could solve “coordination failure” in the market without external enforcement mechanisms, which contradicts conventional intervention polices. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Overlapping networks; Social dilemmas; Evolutioanry dyanmics; Self-organizing phenomenon (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10614-014-9447-6 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:compec:v:46:y:2015:i:1:p:1-14

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10614/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10614-014-9447-6

Access Statistics for this article

Computational Economics is currently edited by Hans Amman

More articles in Computational Economics from Springer, Society for Computational Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().