On the Allocation of Multiple Divisible Assets to Players with Different Utilities

Ephraim Zehavi () and Amir Leshem ()
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Ephraim Zehavi: Bar-Ilan University
Amir Leshem: Bar-Ilan University

Computational Economics, 2018, vol. 52, issue 1, No 12, 253-274

Abstract: Abstract When there is a dispute between players on how to divide multiple divisible assets, how should it be resolved? In this paper we introduce a multi-asset game model that enables cooperation between multiple agents who bargain on sharing K assets, when each player has a different value for each asset. It thus extends the sequential discrete Raiffa solution and the Talmud rule solution to multi-asset cases.

Keywords: Spectrum optimization; Distributed coordination; Game theory; Raiffa bargaining solution; Talmud rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s10614-017-9673-9

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