A Spatial Game Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Identity

Anirban Ghatak (), Diganta Mukherjee and K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao
Additional contact information
Anirban Ghatak: Welingkar Institute of Management Development and Research
Diganta Mukherjee: Indian Statistical Institute
K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao: Indian Institute of Technology Bombay

Computational Economics, 2018, vol. 52, issue 2, No 9, 493-519

Abstract: Abstract Using theoretical arguments and extensive simulations, in this paper we conclude that in a spatial evolutionary Hawk–Dove game with uncorrelated asymmetry and informational asymmetry, the evolutionarily stable strategy against multiple mutations (ESSMM) largely coincides with the fairness equilibria of Hawk–Dove game. The shift from one fairness equilibrium to another bases itself on risk dominance criterion. Moreover, we notice that in spatial games the ESSMM turns out to be pure strategy except in the case where every player has prior information about the identity of the other player. Our results has interesting implications for designing fair behaviour inducing mechanisms.

Keywords: Evolutionary game; Multiple mutations; Spatial game; Identity; Conflict; Behavioral game; Fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C73 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10614-017-9684-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:compec:v:52:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10614-017-9684-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10614/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10614-017-9684-6

Access Statistics for this article

Computational Economics is currently edited by Hans Amman

More articles in Computational Economics from Springer, Society for Computational Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().