The Limits to Credit Growth: Mitigation Policies and Macroprudential Regulations to Foster Macrofinancial Stability and Sustainable Debt

Sander Hoog ()
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Sander Hoog: Bielefeld University

Computational Economics, 2018, vol. 52, issue 3, No 7, 873-920

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we study an economy with a high degree of financialization in which (non-financial) firms need loans from commercial banks to finance production, service debt, and make long-term investments. Along the business cycle, the economy follows a Minsky base cycle with firms traversing through the various stages of financial fragility, i.e. hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance (cf., Minsky in The financial instability hypothesis: a restatement. Hyman P Minsky archive paper, vol 180, pp 541–552, 1978; Stabilizing an unstable economy. Yale University Press, 2nd edn 2008, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1986; The financial instability hypothesis. Economics working paper archive wp74. The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, 1992). In the speculative financial stage cash flows are insufficient to finance the repayment of principle but sufficient for paying interest, so banks are willing to roll-over credits in order to prevent loan defaults. In the Ponzi financial position even interest payments cannot be served, but banks my still be willing to keep firms alive through “extend and pretend” loans, also known as zombie-lending (Caballero et al. in Am Econ Rev 98(5):1943–1977, 2008). This lending behavior may cause credit bubbles with increasing leverage ratios. Empirical evidence suggests that recessions following such leveraging booms are more severe and can be associated to higher economic costs (Jordà et al. in J Money Credit Bank 45(s2):3–28, 2013; Schularick and Taylor in Am Econ Rev 102(2):1029–1061, 2012). We study macroprudential regulations aimed at: (i) the prevention and mitigation of credit bubbles, (ii) ensuring macro-financial stability, and (iii) limiting the ability of banks to create unsustainable debt bubbles. Our results show that limiting the credit growth by using a non-risk-weighted capital ratio has slightly positive effects, while using loan eligibility criteria such as cutting off funding to all financially unsound firms (speculative and Ponzi) has strong positive effects.

Keywords: Macroprudential regulation; Full reserve banking; Full equity finance; Agent-based macroeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 E03 G01 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10614-017-9714-4

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