Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions

Pierre Salmon

Constitutional Political Economy, 2001, vol. 12, issue 4, 333-349

Keywords: elections; constitutions; majority; proportional representation; probabilistic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Working Paper: Constitutional Implications of electoral assumptions (2001)
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1012581007940

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