Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues?

Bernard Steunenberg

Constitutional Political Economy, 2001, vol. 12, issue 4, 370 pages

Keywords: constitutional choice; game forms; EU enlargement; institutional reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1012533124779

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