Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited

Zane Spindler and Xavier De Vanssay

Constitutional Political Economy, 2003, vol. 14, issue 2, 95-105

Keywords: constitutional design; rent seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1023639521374

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