Federalism and Conflicts over Principalship. Some Insights into the American Constitutional History

Jean-Michel Josselin () and Alain Marciano

Constitutional Political Economy, 2004, vol. 15, issue 3, 304 pages

Abstract: The article provides an economic interpretation of Kelsen's theory of decentralized governments. It helps to distinguish different forms of federalism and in particular the corresponding conflicts of principalship inside the governmental structure. The model is applied to the early American constitutional history and shows how opposed views of agency relationships in the constitution foreshadowed what would later end up in a civil war.

Date: 2004
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