A Theoretical Basis for the Consideration of Spending Thresholds in the Analysis of Fiscal Referendums

Marc-Jean Martin ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2004, vol. 15, issue 4, 359-370

Abstract: This paper concerns the political economy of budget balances and focuses on fiscal referendums. It specifically suggests – on the basis of theoretical arguments –that any analysis of fiscal referendums must take their spending thresholds into account. Thus, it claims that mandatory fiscal referendums can impose greater constraints than optional fiscal referendums. In conclusion, various recommendations based on this observation are proposed. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Keywords: analysis of collective decision-making; state and local budget and expenditure; political economy; budget systems; referendum; fiscal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-004-7768-5

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