Vetoes Overridable by Simple Majorities

Thomas Schwartz ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2004, vol. 15, issue 4, 383-389

Abstract: Conventional wisdom has it that the absolute (purely negative) veto is ineffective when overridable by a simple majority. That is flatly false. The examples that prove this surprising fact are themselves surprisingly ordinary yet oddly resistant to direct observation. They reveal virtues of a neglected institutional design. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Keywords: voting; veto; simple majority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-004-7770-y

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