Federal Stability in Unequal Societies

Simon Hug ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2005, vol. 16, issue 2, 113-124

Abstract: The stability of federal systems is a thorny issue. Several scholars have attempted to come to grips with this problem and have proposed mechanisms or institutions which may contribute to the stabilization of federal systems. In many instances, however, the underlying mechanisms and micro-foundations are poorly specified. In this paper I build upon existing models dealing with decentralization and secession to incorporate unequal income distributions and externalities of public goods. Based on this some insights may be derived on the appropriate mechanisms to foster federal stability. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: federalism; income; distribution; secession (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10602-005-2231-9 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:16:y:2005:i:2:p:113-124

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10602/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10602-005-2231-9

Access Statistics for this article

Constitutional Political Economy is currently edited by Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

More articles in Constitutional Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().