Federalism as a Public Good

Jenna Bednar ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2005, vol. 16, issue 2, 189-205

Abstract: This paper suggests that stabilizing federalism is like solving a public good provision problem. It reviews results in the public good provision literature that are relevant for federalism, and discusses the implications of these results for the institutional design of federalism. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: Intergovernmental relations; government performance; institutional design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-005-2235-5

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