Constitutional Foundations of Economic Freedom: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis

Xavier Vanssay, Vincent Hildebrand and Zane Spindler

Constitutional Political Economy, 2005, vol. 16, issue 4, 327-346

Abstract: Using time-series cross-section analysis, we provide additional empirical validation for the principal-agent model developed by Adserà et al. (2003). In our innovation, efficient economic policy is proxied by “economic freedom” from the Fraser Institute database and constitutional “political institutions” are proxied by variables from the Database of Political Institutions. Our results suggest that the more credible the threat of removal from office, the more government officials will pursue efficient economic policies. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: good governance; economic freedom; principal-agent; political institutions; constitutions; D72; D78; H11; O57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10602-005-4314-z (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:16:y:2005:i:4:p:327-346

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10602/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10602-005-4314-z

Access Statistics for this article

Constitutional Political Economy is currently edited by Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

More articles in Constitutional Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().