Deficits and Divided Governments: The Case of the German ‘Bundesrat’

Peter Schwarz

Constitutional Political Economy, 2006, vol. 17, issue 2, 87-101

Abstract: The hypothesis of divided government is applied to the development of deficits in Germany. Since the party system is relatively stable, divided governments emerge not from coalitional governments, but rather from the bicameral structure of the country. Different majorities in the two chambers promote deficits, especially in the case of central government deficits. The results suggest that under different majorities in the two chambers deficits are more than 0.5%-Point higher. Further, it is indicated, that only ideological polarization, but not unstable majorities per se induces higher deficits. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

Keywords: Deficit; Bicameralism; Divided governments; H62; P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-006-0003-9

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