The electoral college: diversification and the election process

Chris Cain, Peter Basciano () and Ellen Cain

Constitutional Political Economy, 2007, vol. 18, issue 1, 34 pages

Abstract: The basic financial principle of diversification is applied to the U.S. Presidential election process. Applying this principle shows that the current Electoral College system may offer significant advantages over a direct voting system. Calls for an abolishment of the Electoral College may be premature if the goal of the election process is to ensure accurate results. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: Election; Electoral college; Constitution; Modern portfolio theory; Voting; Diversification; G0; P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-006-9010-0

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