On the evaluation of power in parliaments and government formation

Nicolas Andjiga, Daoud Badirou and Boniface Mbih

Constitutional Political Economy, 2007, vol. 18, issue 2, 69-82

Abstract: This paper is devoted to the study of power in Parliaments. We explain how the power of coalitions can be computed after elections. We add to the existing literature by using this analysis to predict what government may emerge from these elections. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: Power indices; Parliamentary method; Core; Coalition formation; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: On the evaluation of power in parliaments and government formation (2007)
Working Paper: On the evaluation of power in Parliaments and government formation (2007)
Working Paper: On the evaluation of power in Parliaments and government formation (2006)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-006-9012-y

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