Neoliberal ordnungstheorie and constitutional economics

Helmut Leipold

Constitutional Political Economy, 1990, vol. 1, issue 1, 47-65

Abstract: Various new theoretical approaches, such as the economics of property rights, economic analysis of law or constitutional economics, have led to a renaissance of institutional theory. To a large extent, this renaissance emerged independently of the old institutionalism. In Germany, institutional analysis has a long and autonomous tradition, which has not been given proper international recognition. This applies especially to the neoliberal Ordnungstheorie, of which Walter Eucken is generally acknowledged to be the leading representative. This article examines the methodological and theoretical similarities and differences between Eucken's Ordnungstheorie and Buchanan's Constitutional Economics. Copyright George Mason University 1990

Date: 1990
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02393033

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