From paradoxes to social rules, or: How economics repeats itself

Bruno Frey

Constitutional Political Economy, 1990, vol. 1, issue 2, 27-34

Abstract: There is an analogy of how the paradox of aggregation (Arrow impossibility theorem) and the paradoxa of individual behavior (people decide inconsistently) have been approached in mainstream research. In both cases it is disregarded that paradoxa are part of social reality. A constitutional approach focussing on rules and institutions promises to yield more fruitful insights. Copyright George Mason University 1990

Date: 1990
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02393039

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