The microfoundations of rules vs. discretion

Daniel Klein

Constitutional Political Economy, 1990, vol. 1, issue 3, 19 pages

Abstract: Using anN-person model, I explore the microfoundations of benevolent rules-dominant situations (of which the familiar time inconsistency models are examples). I show that under discretion the citizens confront a prisoner's dilemma, and I discuss the similar dilemmas embedded in the time inconsistency models. I then suggest new solutions to benevolent rules dominance: suboptimality can be avoided by accepting the discretionary regime and applying to the citizen population the standard remedies to the prisoner's dilemma. Copyright George Mason University 1990

Date: 1990
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02393238

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